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Every fifteen minutes a poacher kills an elephant for its ivory. If this 
rate continues, the African elephant could become extinct in twenty 
years. Although federal law has strictly regulated the ivory market for 
several decades, the United States remains one of the largest markets 
for illegal wildlife products in the world. Because there are little to no 
enforcement mechanisms or verification processes by which to 
definitively distinguish legal from illegal ivory after reaching domestic 
markets, illegal ivory is easily mixed in with legal stocks. New 
regulations have been promulgated, but are they enough? 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite some successes made under the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (“CITES” or the “Convention”), African 
elephants are prone to go extinct sometime in the 2020s. In 2014, 
President Barack Obama’s Administration rolled out new regulations 
in an effort to stem the crisis. Despite some gains, the new ivory 
regulations still do not adequately close domestic loopholes, provide 
necessary funding, reduce demand, or provide for public outreach or 
education. This paper posits four recommendations that correct for 
these deficiencies: (1) requiring forensic-analysis, (2) increasing 
funding, (3) increasing international pressure on nations with key ivory 
markets, and (4) developing public outreach initiatives. 
Part I of this paper will develop the background of the crisis facing 
the African elephant. Part II will discuss and analyze major 
shortcomings of CITES as they relate to the international ivory trade. 
In the international context provided by Part II, Part III will analyze the 
shortcomings of domestic ivory regulations. As noted above, Part IV 
will articulate four recommendations that the United States should 
implement in order to actualize the objectives that underlie the new 
rules, i.e., to combat rising ivory demand and reverse the African 
elephant’s precipitous population decline. Finally, the Conclusion 
completes the analysis with concluding remarks. 
I 
BACKGROUND 
An understanding of the CITES framework and organizational 
structure provides context to how international ivory trade developed. 
This provides context for how domestic ivory trade regulations 
developed and continued to operate until 2014. The 2014 regulations 
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build upon and operate within these contexts and they, as well as their 
enduring obstacles, are introduced accordingly. 
A. CITES Framework and Organizational Structure 
Since its adoption in 1975, CITES has governed international 
commerce in wildlife products according to a species’ listing.1 The 
listings are organized into one of three Appendixes, which restrict trade 
by imposing varying levels of import and export control. “Trade” in 
Appendix I specimens, for example, requires the appointed 
Management and Scientific Authority (“MA”) of both the importing 
and exporting nations to issue permits based on “non-determinant 
findings,” that trade “will not be detrimental to the survival of that 
species.”2 
CITES establishes a permanent Secretariat who:(1) provides the 180 
signatory countries (“Parties”) with trade information and technical 
support; (2) serves as a liaison among Parties; (3) contracts trade 
studies; (4) informs governments and the public about CITES wildlife 
trade developments; (5) investigates possible CITES violations and 
trade threats to wildlife; and (6) organizes meetings of the Conference 
of the Parties (“CoP”).3 The CoP is composed of representatives from 
 
1 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 (entered into force July 1, 1975) 
[hereinafter CITES]. These levels of protection are a function of the degree of threat to the 
survival of a species. Appendix I species are likely to become extinct absent strict 
restrictions on the international trade of the species. Specifically, Article II(1) of CITES 
states: “Appendix I shall include all species threatened with extinction which are or may be 
affected by trade. Trade in specimens of these species must be subject to particularly strict 
regulation in order not to endanger further their survival and must only be authorized in 
exceptional circumstances.” Appendix II species are likely to become endangered absent 
moderate restrictions in the international trade of the species. Article II(2) of CITES states: 
Appendix II shall include: (a) all species which although are not necessarily now 
threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of such species 
is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their 
survival; and (b) other species which must be subject to strict regulation in order that 
trade in specimens in certain species referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph 
may be brought under effective control. Appendix III is comprised of species whose 
trade needs to be regulated to avoid exploitation. 
2 Id. at Art. III(2)(a). Each Party designates an MA to issue permits, make legal and 
scientific findings, and monitor trade. Id.  at art I(g). See 50 C.F.R. § 23.61(a) (2007) 
(describing factors considered in making a non-detriment finding in the United States). 
3 See id. at Art. XI-XII. 
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the Parties and meets approximately every two years to assess the 
implementation of the Convention.4 
CITES recognizes two global monitoring systems for trade in 
elephant specimens.5 The Monitoring Illegal Killing of Elephants 
(“MIKE”), managed by the CITES Secretariat, and the Elephant Trade 
Information System (“ETIS”), managed by TRAFFIC, are both used to 
track illegal trade in ivory and other elephant specimens per Resolution 
Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP15).6 Thirdly, Article VIII, paragraph 7(a) of the 
Convention, requires CITES Parties to submit annual reports on their 
trade of CITES-listed species.7 Such data, including legal trade in all 
elephant specimens, are compiled by the United Nations 
Environmental Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre.8 
Fourth, the International Union for the Conversation of Nature 
maintains the African and Asian Elephant Database, which collects 
information on elephant populations, such as numbers and range.9 
In 2010, the CITES Secretariat, INTERPOL, United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime, the World Bank, and the World Customs 
Organization formed the International Consortium on Combating 
Wildlife Crime (“ICCWC”) to raise awareness of wildlife crime, build 
the capacity of enforcement organizations, foster coordinated 
enforcement action, and address the drivers of wildlife crime to reduce 
demand.10 Reflecting its capacity-building focus, ICCWC developed 
the Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit to provide Parties with 
a framework to assess their effectiveness in preventing and responding 
to wildlife crime.11  These information sharing regimes provide Parties 
 
4 Id. at art. XI(2); Conference of the Parties, http://cites.org/eng/disc/cop.php (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2015). 
5 See CITES, Fifteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, African Elephant Action 
Plan, CoP15 Inf. 68 (Mar. 13−25, 2010), http://www.cites.org/common/cop/15/inf/E15i-68 
.pdf. 
6 CITES, Elephant Conservation, Illegal Killing and Ivory Trade, SC62 Doc. 46.1 /Rev. 
1, (July 23−27 2012), http://www.cites.org/eng/com/sc/62/E62-46-01.pdf; see also 
TRAFFIC, ETIS: Dissecting the Illegal Ivory Trade, (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.Traffic 
.org/home/2013/10/23/etis-dissecting-the-illegal-ivory-trade.html. 
7 CITES, supra n.1, at art. VIII(7). 
8 CITES, Status Of Elephant Populations, Levels of Illegal Killing and the Trade in Ivory: 
A Report to the Standing Committee of CITES, SC61 Doc. 44.2/Rev 1, 3 (2011), 
http://www.cites.org/eng/com/sc/61/E61-44-02-A1.pdf. 
9 Id. 
10 Bruce Zagaris, CITES Meeting Focuses on Strategic Vision and Enforcement, 29 INT’L 
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 5, 144 (2013). 
11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Wildlife and Forest Analytic Toolkit, 
http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/resources/pub/wildlife_crime_analytic_toolkit.pdf 
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with a system into which they can pool domestic tracking data, which 
can then be used by monitoring NGOs or governments to assist with 
their respective domestic or international tracking efforts. 
B. Global Ivory Trade Development 
The World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”) estimates that between three to 
five million African elephants once traversed the continent of Africa as 
recently as the 1940s.12 In one decade of the twentieth-century, 
however, elephant populations were reduced by 50%, bottoming out at 
625,000 in 1989.13 In response, the United States led an international 
movement to enforce unilateral bans on the export and import of 
African elephant ivory in 1988.14 Other countries followed and in 1989, 
the CoP banned the international commercial trade in African elephant 
ivory by uplisting the species to Appendix I.15 Initially, the ban worked. 
Prices fell, demand dropped, and elephant populations began to 
recover.16 In 1997, the Parties adopted Res. Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP16), 
which recommended that ivory carving and importing countries enact 
comprehensive internal legislative, regulatory, and enforcement 
measures.17 Critically, Res. Conf. 10.10 recommended that Parties, 
including the United States, “register or license all importers, 
manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers” dealing in ivory products.18 
In addition, Parties agreed to implement recording and inspection 
procedures to monitor the flow of ivory within their borders.19 
In 1999, CITES approved a “one-off sale” of fifty metric tons of 
stockpiled ivory from Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe to Japan. 
This sudden influx of legal ivory correlated with increased demand: an 
 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2015). These databases can be drawn upon for the data collection 
efforts as advocated below in Part IV. 
12 World Wildlife Foundation, Threats, (last visited Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.world 
wildlife.org/species/African-elephant. 
13 See Karen Sack, Elephant Ivory Trade Ban, 1 TED Case Studies (Sept. 1992), 
http://www1.american.edu/ted/elephant.htm. 
14 Id. 
15 Thomas Princen, The Ivory Trade Ban: NGOs and International Conservation, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN WORLD POLITICS: LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL, 
121, 127 (Thomas Princen & Matthias Finger eds., 1994). 
16 Id. at 129. 
17 CITES, Decisions of the Conference of the Parties, 125 (June 9−20, 1997), http://www 
.cites.org/eng/cop/10/E10-Decisions.pdf. 
18 CITES, Trade in Elephant Specimens, Res. Conf. 10.10/Rev. CoP16 (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/10/10-10R16.php. 
19 Id. 
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additional six metric tons of ivory were seized, and 1,059 African 
elephants poached.20 In 2004, China introduced an ivory product 
registration and certification system to meet the conditions of Res. 
Conf. 10.10, and to secure its participation in future one-off sales.21 In 
2008, CITES approved an additional one-off sale and sixty-two metric 
tons of government stockpiled ivory were exported to China, 
resurrecting the Chinese ivory carving art markets.22 
Since 2007, the global illegal ivory trade activity has more than 
tripled pre-ban levels,23 while African elephant populations face an 
unprecedented decline.24 
The United States is the world’s second largest retail market for 
elephant ivory products, with a documented 24,004 ivory products in 
657 outlets in sixteen American cities.25 Studies estimate that as much 
as one-third of ivory items for sale in the United States were imported 
illegally,26 while a total of 3,125 illegal ivory items are imported into 
and exported out of the United States per year.27 
China is the largest ivory consumer in the world. As the final 
destination of an estimated 70% of all ivory,28 the price of ivory in 
China more than tripled between 2006 and 2011.29 An investigation by 
the Environmental Investigation Agency (“EIA”) in 2008 uncovered 
 
20 HUMANE SOC. INT’L, Ivory Trade & CITES, http://www.hsi.org/campaigns/dont_buy 
_wild/african_ivory_trade.html. (last visited Nov. 27, 2015). 
21 GRACE G. GABRIEL ET AL., INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE, MAKING A KILLING: 
A 2011 SURVEY OF IVORY MARKETS IN CHINA, 2 (2012), http://www.ifaw.org/sites 
/default/files/ Making%20a%20Killing.pdf. 
22 Tom Milliken, TRAFFIC, Illegal Trade in Ivory and Rhino Horn: An Assessment 
Report to Improve Law Enforcement Under the Wildlife TRAPS Project, 1 (Sept. 2014), 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/W-TRAPS-Elephant-Rhino          
-report.pdf. 
23 Int’l Fund for Animal Welfare, Criminal Nature: The Global Security Implications Of 
The Illegal Wildlife Trade, 8 (June 2013), http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/ifaw             
-criminal-nature-2013-low-res_0.pdf. 
24 BBC Nature News, African Forest Elephants Decline by 62% in 10 Years (Mar. 5, 
2013), http://bbc.co.uk/nature/21655613. 
25 Beth Allgood et al., U.S. Ivory Trade: Can A Crackdown on Trafficking Save the Last 
Titan?, 20 ANIMAL L. 27, 48 (2013) (citation omitted). 
26 Humane Soc. Int’l, Ivory Trade & CITES, HUMANE SOC. INT’L (last viewed Dec. 12, 
2014), http://www. hsi.org/campaigns/dont_buy_wild/african_ivory_trade.html. 
27 Allgood et al., supra note 25, at 31 (Extrapolating border seizures data, and using 
INTERPOL’s assessment that seized wildlife represents only 10% of actual illegal trade). 
28 Sharon Montazeri, Protecting The Pachyderm: The Significance Of Ivory Trade 
Regulation For African Elephant Conservation, 22 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 121, 127 
(Fall 2013). 
29 Id. 
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persuasive evidence of widespread abuse and fraud in China’s 
registration system,30 reporting that an estimated 90% of the ivory for 
sale was laundered into the legal market.31 Alarmingly, official Chinese 
documents reveal that an estimated 110 tons of ivory, i.e., 11,000 
elephant tusks, “had gone missing from government stockpiles and that 
illegal sales were suspected.”32 Despite the registration system, a 2014 
study estimates that 26.5% of the thousands of elephant ivory items for 
sale in major Chinese markets are illegal.33 
In the most recent Conference, CoF16, the Secretariat reported that 
the amount of seized ivory had greatly escalated since CoF15 in 2011, 
and was at its highest level since 1996,34 when reporting by ETIS 
began.35 Indeed, elephant populations have dropped well below 1989 
levels, as “[e]very [fifteen] minutes, an elephant is killed illegally in 
Africa to feed an insatiable demand for ivory, principally from Asia.”36 
While the issue of whether demand for ivory is “pure” or is coupled 
with one-off sales is hotly debated, all sources agree that demand is 
increasing and trade controls can work.37 Nevertheless, if current rates 
 
30 See ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, CHINA, IVORY TRADE & THE FUTURE OF 
AFRICA’S ELEPHANTS (2008), http://eiaglobal.org/images/uploads/China.Ivory_Trade 
__the_Future_of _Africas_Elephants.pdf. 
31 See Dan Levin, From Elephants’ Mouths, an Illicit Trail to China, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 
1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/world/asia/an-illicit-trail-of-african-ivory-to 
-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
32 See ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, supra note 30, at 4. 
33 Lucy Vigne & Esmond Martin, China Faces A Conservation Challenge The 
Expanding Elephant And Mammoth Ivory Trade In Beijing and Shanghai, SAVE THE 
ELEPHANTS & THE ASPINALL FOUNDATION, 6 (2014), http://savetheelephants.org/wp            
-content/uploads/2014/12/ 2014_ChinaConservationChallenge.pdf; see also Levin, supra 
note 31 (estimating that current Chinese demand amounts to 40,000 tusks for a total of 
20,000 elephants per year); CITES, supra note 6. While estimates indicate that the 
percentage of illegally traded ivory in China is approximately 10% less than in U.S. markets, 
the Chinese import approximately 140 of the 200 tons traded globally per year. Id. 
34 CITES, ETIS Report on Traffic, CoP16 Doc. 53.2.2, 2 /Rev. 1 (Mar. 3−14, 2013), 
available at http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-53-02-02.pdf. 
35 CITES, Status Of Elephant Populations, Levels Of Illegal Killing And The Trade In 
Ivory: A Report To The Cites Standing Committees, 62 Doc. 46.1/Rev. 1, annex p. 4 (July 
23−27, 2012). 
36 Carl Safina, Blood Ivory, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 11, 2013) (visited Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/opinion/global/blood-ivory.html?_r=0 (noting that “if 
the thirty-eight tons of tusks seized in 2011 represented 10% of illegal ivory, it translates to 
something over 40,000 elephants killed annually—an elephant every fifteen minutes”). 
37 Daniel Stiles, CITES–approved ivory sales & elephant poaching, 45 PACHYDERM 150, 
152 (July 2008–June 2009) (concluding that one-off sales did not cause subsequent spike in 
demand; however, attention given by opponents of the CITES-authorized one-off sales has 
“diverted attention from the real dilemma, which is how to deal with high ivory demand.”); 
but see Bryan Christy, Blood Ivory: Ivory Worship, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
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continue, the African elephant could become extinct in the next 
decade38 
C. Domestic Ivory Control (pre-2014) 
The United States has three key statutory layers through which to 
regulate ivory; first, Congress implemented CITES into U.S. law in the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) of 1973.39 The ESA makes it 
unlawful to “engage in any trade in any specimens contrary to the 
provisions of the Convention.”40 Mirroring the CITES Appendix 
system, the ESA lists species as either “endangered” or “threatened,” 
which trigger various interstate and international trade and use 
restrictions, including licensing, monitoring, and enforcement.41 The 
Lacey Act forms the second layer of domestic law by requiring 
import/export labels for wildlife shipments and allowing officials to 
marshal other state and international wildlife laws during prosecutions 
involving customs violations.42 The third layer, the African Elephant 
Conservation Act (“AfECA”), was Congress’ initial response to the 
early poaching crises of the 1970s and 80s, and was the domestic 
iteration of the United States’ international push for the 1989 ivory ban 
under CITES.43 The AfECA limits the kinds of ivory that can be 
 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2012/10/ivory/christy-text (noting that China told 
CITES that the 1999 one-off sale to Japan was the main cause of China’s growing ivory-
smuggling problem because the sale had confused Chinese consumers, leading them to 
believe the international ivory trade had been resumed); see generally Allan Thornton et al., 
Lethal Experiment: How the CITES-approved ivory sales led to increased elephant 
poaching, ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY 5−8, 28, 32, (2001). 
38 Nicole Le Marie, 12 Years Until Elephants Are All Wiped Out As One Dies Every 15 
Minutes, METRO (Aug. 12, 2013). 
39 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 
(2006)). 
40 Id. at § 1538(c)(1). 
41 Compare CITES Appendix, supra note 1, with 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, .21, .22, .31, .32 
(2015). 
42 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2015). 
43 See id. at §§ 4201–4245 (2015). 
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imported and exported44 and creates civil and criminal penalties for 
anyone who “knowingly violates [the] prohibited acts.”45 
The ESA listing of the African elephant as “endangered” grants the 
Fish & Wildlife Service (“FWS”) the ability to create trade exceptions 
so long as they further conservation efforts.46 Until early 2014, FWS 
maintained two such trade exceptions for African elephant ivory: (1) 
antiques could be imported, exported, and sold, and (2) legally sport 
hunted trophies, such as elephant heads or tusks shot on safari or other 
sanctioned events, could be imported but not sold.47 
D. U.S. Domestic Ivory Control (post-2014) 
Responding to the escalating “international crisis” of wildlife 
trafficking and its threat to the survival of elephants, President Barack 
Obama took unprecedented action by issuing the Executive Order 
13648 (“EO”) on “Combating Wildlife Trafficking.”48 The EO 
articulated four broad policy objectives therein: the United States shall 
“(a) . . . seek to assist [foreign] governments in anti-wildlife trafficking 
activities,” as requested by foreign nations; (b) “promote and 
encourage the development and enforcement by foreign nations of 
effective laws to prohibit the illegal taking of ivory bearing species and 
to prosecute those who engage [in such] wildlife trafficking”; (c) 
“develop international community and partner organizations”; and (d) 
“seek to reduce the demand for illegally traded wildlife, both at home 
 
44 Id., at § 4223 (“Except as provided in section 4222(e), it is unlawful for any person: 
(1) to import raw ivory from any country other than an ivory-producing country; (2) to 
export raw ivory from the United States; (3) to import raw or worked ivory that was exported 
from an ivory producing country in violation of that country’s laws or of the CITES Ivory 
Control System; (4) to import worked ivory, other than personal effects, from any country 
unless that country has certified that such ivory was derived from legal sources; or (5) to 
import raw or worked ivory from a country for which a moratorium is in effect under section 
4222 of this title.”). 
 Section 4222(e) is the sport hunting exception, which allows individuals to “import sport-
hunted elephant trophies that they have legally taken.” Id. Notably, the Secretary has no 
authority to abolish the exception under the AfECA. Id. 
45 Id. at § 4224.  
46 See id. at § 1533(d). 
47 Peter LaFontaine et al., Treasured to Death: Elephants, Ivory, and the Resurgence of 
a Crisis, 29 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, 1 (Summer 2014) (noting FWS’ justification that 
sport hunting incentivizes elephant conservation through local communities and 
governments whom benefit financially from “sustainable management” of their animal 
populations). 
48 Exec. Order No. 13648, 78 Fed. Reg. 40621 (July 1, 2013). 
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and abroad.”49 The EO established the interagency Presidential Task 
Force on Wildlife Trafficking and the Advisory Council on Wildlife 
Trafficking (“Wildlife Task Force”) to advise federal agencies on how 
to implement these policy objectives.50 
On February 11, 2014, Wildlife Task Force announced three 
strategic objectives: (1) strengthen enforcement; (2) reduce demand for 
illegally traded wildlife; and (3) build international cooperation, 
commitment, and public-private partnerships.51 In response, the White 
House translated these strategies into four enforcement directives by 
ordering federal departments and agencies to: “prohibit the commercial 
import and export of African elephant ivory; significantly restrict 
domestic resale of elephant ivory”; clarify the definition of “antique”; 
restore ESA protection for African elephants;52 and impose limits on 
the sport-hunting of African elephants.53 As the principal federal 
agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the ESA and 
CITES,54 the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) took the “first step by 
issuing a director’s order that halted the import of all commercial ivory 
items, clarified the definition of “antique,” and provided border and 
customs officials guidance for implementing the new rules.55 Second, 
FWS finalized its new CITES “use after import” regulations in May 
2014, which imposed stricter controls on domestic ivory sales.56 Sellers 
must now obtain certification that their ivory falls under one of the 
narrowed ESA section 4(d) exemptions.57 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 The White House, National Strategy For Combating Wildlife Trafficking, 5 (Feb. 11, 
2014), http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2014/trafficking/national-strategy-wildlife-traf 
ficking.pdf. 
52 The agency later abandoned uplisting the African elephant to ESA category I 
protection due to public and political protest; see generally LaFontaine et al., supra note 47. 
53 See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: National 
Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking & Commercial Ban on Trade in Elephant Ivory 
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1fqJofy. 
54 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Efforts to Control Illegal Elephant Ivory Trade  
& Internal Markets (Sept. 2012), http://cqrcengage.com/elephantprotection/file/mkFd0w 
2BLj7/Atch2_factsheet-us-efforts-to-control-illegal-elephant-ivory-trade.pdf [hereinafter 
FWS]. 
55 See Revision of Regulations Implementing CITES, 79 Fed. Reg. 30,399, 30,410 (May 
27, 2014) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pts. 10, 163, and 178); see also US Dep’t of Interior, 
Director’s Order No. 210 (Feb. 25, 2014) (amended May 15, 2014). 
56 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e)(3) (2014). 
57 Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (conferring upon the Secretary the authority to 
exempt ESA takes that advance the overall conservation of a listed species). 
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Further, in responding to the President’s directive, FWS is in the 
process of proposing rules that would: (1) prohibit all commercial 
imports;58 (2) restrict exports and interstate sale to “bona fide 
antiques”;59 (3) limit sport hunters to two trophies, i.e., four tusks per 
year for import (replacing the old rule that allowed an unlimited 
number of tusks); and (4) shift the burden of proof for domestic sales 
from the government to the person claiming the exemption by requiring 
CITES pre-Convention or ESA certificates to accompany the 
commercial transaction.60 
These proposed regulations call into question longstanding 
regulatory assumptions and rules regarding the domestic ivory trade, as 
well as the seminal Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, U.S. v. 
Grigsby, in which the Court’s statutory construction greatly impaired 
the government’s ability to enforce violations under the AfECA.61 The 
FWS claims that finalization will “place a nearly complete ban on 
commercial trade in [African] elephant ivory” in the United States;62 
however, several obstacles challenge the completeness of FWS’ rules. 
E. Enduring Obstacles 
Although requiring sellers (and by conveyance of title, buyers) to 
obtain CITES and ESA certificates through FWS for domestic ivory 
sales is a step in the right direction,63 curtailing the wholesale slaughter 
 
58 “[E]xcept for certain items and purposes where the ivory item will not be sold, 
including sport-hunted trophies, ivory for law enforcement and scientific purposes . . . 
musical instruments, items in museums and other exhibitions, and items that are part of a 
household move or inheritance.” 
59 “[And items that are either] accompanied by an ESA permit . . . or [were] lawfully 
imported prior to listing in CITES Appendix I (1990 for African elephant) and with no 
restrictions on its use after import or under a CITES pre-Convention certificate.” 
60 CITES supra note 55, at 30,409; see also Director’s Order No. 210, supra note 55. 
61 U.S. v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806, 816 (11th Cir. 1997) (construing “knowingly violates” 
as a “specific intent” requirement that the state must prove under AfECA); see LaFontaine 
et al., supra note 47, at 4 (noting that the specific intent standard has made prosecutions 
under AfECA “few and far between”). 
62 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., USFWS Moves to Ban Commercial Elephant Ivory Trade: 
Questions & Answers, http://www.fws.gov/international/travel-and-trade/ivory-ban-ques 
tions-and-answers.html#30 (last viewed Dec. 12, 2014). 
63 See Allgood et al., supra note 25, at 72−73 (recommending several measures, such as 
reinstating the general intent standard in criminal prosecutions and limiting the sport trophy 
exception that FWS would later propose in 2014); see also CITES, Trade in Elephant 
Specimens, Res. Conf. 10.10/Rev. CoP16 (2013), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res 
/10/10-10R16.php (directing the Secretariat to “identify those Parties that have unregulated 
internal markets for ivory,” such as the United States, and urging the adoption of licensing 
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of African elephants will require more than the promulgation of these 
rules. 
Indeed, there are four fundamental obstacles to achieving such 
substantiate gains where the rules, even if fully adopted, fall short. 
First, the rules do not adequately close the sport trophy and antique 
exemptions because ESA/CITES certificates are based primarily on 
chain of title, rather than forensic analysis, and do not meet the 
Convention’s verification, tracking, and communication requirements. 
In addition, retroactive CITES certificates have an “increasingly 
negative impact on the possibilities for properly enforcing the 
Convention through the creation of loopholes for illegal trade.”64 
Second, assuming a forensic-analysis requirement were in place at the 
agency/individual permitting level, the funding necessary to achieve 
such enforcement priorities, including those which the CoP agreed to 
in 2013, is woefully inadequate.65 Third, even a total domestic ban fails 
to contemplate Chinese demand.66 Fourth and fundamentally, the rules 
do not provide for public outreach and education.67 Recommendations 
to help address these problems will be discussed in Part IV, below. 
II 
INTERNATIONAL SHORTCOMINGS OF CITES 
As a Party to CITES, in order to understand the problems with the 
new (and existing) U.S. domestic regulations, it is essential to first 
consider certain weaknesses of CITES in governing the international 
ivory trade. 
CITES alone cannot curb international demand. International 
demand for ivory currently exceeds what can be supplied sustainably.68 
Ivory trade controls that were “imagined by the CITES parties to exist 
at the heart of the ivory importing [regime], and would justify the one-
 
and registration requirements to “regulate the domestic trade [of] raw and worked ivory” in 
such countries). 
64 CITES Res. Conf. 12.3, 1/Rev. CoP16 (2012), https://cites.org/sites/default/files 
/document/E-Res-12-03R16.pdf. 
65 LaFontaine et al., supra note 47, at 7. 
66 See Human Society Int’l., Background on CITES and the International Trade in 
African Ivory, HUMANE SOCIETY INT’L (Apr. 17, 2007), http://www.hsi.org/campaigns 
/dont_buy buy_wild/african_ivory_trade.html. 
67 See Resolution Conf. 10.10/Rev. CoP16, supra note 63. 
68 CHRISTIAN NELLEMANN ET AL., ELEPHANTS IN THE DUST: THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT 
CRISIS, 70 (2013), http://www.unep.org/pdf/RRAivory_draft7.pdf. 
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off sales of ivory, have failed.”69 As the level of disposable income 
continues to reach unprecedented levels, the demand for ivory, which, 
for example, the Chinese regard as a status symbol, is flourishing, while 
the consequences of their buying illegal ivory are largely unknown.70 
CITES lacks an independent mechanism through which the 
consequences of consumption can be communicated so as to reduce 
demand. 
CITES’ approach to conservation is equally problematic. The fact 
that CITES “does not have any direct enforcement or implementation 
capacity” to control domestic trade71 is the “crux of the conservation 
problems for African elephants.”72 Such capacity is instead reserved to 
member states and their asymmetric ability to implement the legally 
binding resolutions and decisions adopted by the CoP.73 In other words, 
there is no way that one State can ensure another State complies with 
the treaty. 
CITES approach to conservation only works in developed countries 
that possess sufficient resources to enforce strict legislation.74 
Developing countries’ efforts to implement CITES’ trade restrictions, 
on the other hand, often results in the contrary by creating a 
“burgeoning illegal trade of the protected species.”75 As an iteration of 
the collective action problem,76 without some other competing 
incentive, CITES trade restrictions have the “perverse impact” of 
incentivizing developing countries to engage in behavior that is 
“antithetical to conservation of the protected species.”77 
Despite this and other shortcomings, the impact of a comprehensive 
U.S. domestic ivory ban would extend well beyond U.S. borders to 
 
69 Ivory & Insecurity: Global Implications of Poaching in Africa: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 61−62 (2012) (statement of Dr. Iain Douglas-
Hamilton, Executive Director, Wildlife Conservation Network). 
70 Id. 
71 R.B. Martin et al., Decision-making Mechanisms and Necessary Conditions for a 
Future Trade in African Elephant Ivory, Consultancy for the CITES Secretariat, SC62 Doc. 
46.4 Annex, 7 (May 24, 2012). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Stefan Carpenter, The Devolution of Conservation: Why CITES Must Embrace 
Community-Based Resource Management, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 43 (2011). 
75 Id. 
76 See generally Christopher Napoli, A Decentralised Approach to Emissions Reductions, 
7 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 24, 28 (2013) (under the Author’s analysis, ivory is a 
common pool resource because exclusion is not feasible). 
77 Carpenter, supra note 74, at 43. 
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China and other major drivers of the crisis, “because the United States’ 
status as a global leader still carries significant weight on [the] issue.”78 
In other words, the United States can overcome the collective action 
problem unilaterally if responsive legislation is adopted and adequately 
enforced. Thus, serious attention must be afforded to U.S. domestic 
policy as an international engine for change. Domestic policy shall 
remain in focus throughout the analysis below. 
III 
U.S. DOMESTIC SHORTCOMINGS UNDER THE CITES PARADIGM 
To the extent the U.S. domestic shortcomings of CITES are 
attributable to the international ones discussed above, identifying the 
shortcomings of U.S. domestic ivory policy must precede any analysis 
that aims to address them. This Part identifies loopholes and funding 
gaps as two primary areas within which the recommendations 
discussed in Part IV are given expression. 
A. Domestic Loopholes 
Hundreds of tusks are imported into the United States each year as 
sport-hunted trophies.79 Notwithstanding the new domestic licensing 
rules, “it is difficult if not impossible” to determine an ivory object’s 
age, origin, or species, unless forensic and other tracking techniques 
are employed.80 The reasons are as follows. First, forensic dating 
determines whether an object is antique (older than 100 years old) or 
pre-convention (pre-1990). Second, DNA analyses determine whether 
an ivory object was harvested from an Asian (Appendix I or II) as 
opposed to an African elephant (always Appendix I) or mammoth, as 
the trade in mammoth ivory is unregulated. Third, DNA analyses also 
determine the African elephant’s origin, which answers whether the 
animal was harvested from a sanctioned area or population. Closing 
these loopholes is indispensable to bolstering the normative imperative 
that killing living African elephants is wrong, both domestically and 
abroad, while impeding smuggler’s efforts to mix illegal with legal 
 
78 Allgood et al., supra note 25, at 30 (noting U.S. leadership in 1990 when its domestic 
trade restrictions prompted action from others around the world) (internal citation omitted). 
79 The Humane Soc’y. of the U.S., An Investigation of Ivory Markets in the United States 
1−2, 13 (2002), http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/Ivory_Trade_Report.pdf 
[hereinafter HSUS]. 
80 Id. at 1 (HSUS study noting how ivory sellers frequently offered to provide fraudulent 
documents to HSUS investigators indicating that elephant ivory was mammoth ivory, that 
“new” ivory was “old” ivory, or that recently imported ivory was imported a long time ago). 
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ivory so as to confuse consumers about their choices and bypass 
government controls. 
B. Funding Gaps 
Of the entire 2014 Federal budget, only $64.7 million was allocated 
for FWS’ law enforcement program to investigate and prosecute 
wildlife, a mere fraction of the FWS’ total budget.81 The 2015 budget 
provides only $2 million over the 2014 level, which falls short by half 
of the additional funding FWS says it needs for effective wildlife 
tracking, forensic testing, investigations, and reducing market demand 
for wildlife products.82 With a caseload of over 13,500 cases spread 
amongst only 450 agents,83 it is apparent that current FWS resources 
are already exhausted.84 The notion that FWS could extend its law 
enforcement capabilities to adequately meet the EO’s policy 
objectives, let alone those mandated by CoP16, has no basis in fact, 
especially in light of the INTERPOL rule of thumb that places the 
actual number of ivory offenses at an order of magnitude that is ten 
times higher than that reported by FWS.85 In fact, according to a 2013 
report from a D.C. government relations law firm,86 “of particular 
concern is the marginal increase in the number of special agents. With 
the increased sophistication seen in today’s wildlife trafficking 
networks, more special agents are needed at a greater number of ports 
of entry to effectively combat illegal activity.”87 Critically, budget cuts 
have forced the FWS to maintain pre-convention personnel levels, 
reducing the number of agents in its Forensics Laboratory.88 Increased 
 
81 Compare Dep’t of the Interior, Budget Justifications and Performance Information 
Fiscal Year FWS [2015] 8 (2014), http://www.doi.gov/budget/upload/FY2015__FWS 
_Greenbook.pdf with Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, H.R. 3547, 113th Cong. 
(2014) (allocating $1.4 billion overall to the agency). 
82 Id. (FWS law enforcement budget needs to increase by: $500,000 to “combat 
expanding illegal wildlife trafficking and support conservation efforts on the ground in 
Africa and across the globe”; $1.2 million to “expand the capability that evidence collected 
through wildlife forensics will provide needed evidence for investigating and prosecuting 
criminal activity”; and “$247,000 to support FWS special agents.”). 
83 FWS, Annual Report: Law Enforcement Program Facts and Figures, 23 (2014). 
84 Id. 
85 Aliza Kempner, The Ivory Crush: Trumpeting In A New Stage In Crime Fighting And 
Conservation, GEO. J. INT’L L. (Dec. 7 2013). 
86 PIKE ASSOCIATES, http://pikeassoc.com/aboutus.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). 
87 Allgood et al., supra note 25, at 46 (quoting Memo from Jeffrey Pike, Pres., Pike 
Assocs. LLC). 
88 Darryl Fears, Inspectors Catch Wildlife Smugglers but Fear the Sequester’s Bite, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience 
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funding is essential to effecting all of the recommendations presented 
below. 
IV 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Part posits four recommendations that correct for these 
deficiencies: (1) require forensic-analysis and information sharing; (2) 
increase funding; (3) increase international pressure on nations with 
key ivory markets; and (4) develop public outreach initiatives. 
A. Forensic Verification & Information Sharing 
CITES was one of the first multilateral environmental agreements to 
provide for an information and monitoring system.89 This system relies 
primarily on parties’ self-reporting of trade records, which have proven 
increasingly unreliable.90 Sophisticated criminal syndicates in the 
United Kingdom, Europe, and the United States increasingly exploit 
legal loopholes to obtain ivory. At the national level of enforcement by 
many signatory states, almost no ivory seizures are properly 
investigated, demonstrated by the fact that “forensic evidence is rarely, 
if ever, taken and analyzed, and accountable and transparent ivory 
stockpile management remain[s] elusive in most countries.”91 
In response, the CoP16 directed the adoption of adequate legislation 
and enforcement controls to prevent ivory that was part of legally 
exported trophies from being used for other purposes, and to ensure 
that these trophies remain in the possession of their owners for the 
purpose indicated by the CITES export permit.92 It also directed Parties 
to adopt proper tracking, identification, communication, and 
verification systems.93 As such, adequate legislation requires 
enforcement controls that employ forensic technologies to: test seized 
ivory; verify CITES certificates of exemption; and consolidate such 
 
/inspectors-catch—wildlife-smugglers-but-fear-the-sequesters-bite/2013/03/10/57e0f956-8 
0ef-11e2-a350-49866afab584_story.html; see also FWS About Us, FWS Forensic Lab., (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.fws.gov/lab/about.php. 
89 Rosalind Reeve, Wildlife Trade, Sanctions and Compliance: Lessons from the CITIES 
Regime, 82 INT’L. AFF. 881, 884 (2006). 
90 CITES, supra note 64, at 1 (observing that “false and invalid permits and certificates 
are used more and more often for fraudulent purposes and that appropriate measures are 
needed to prevent such documents from being accepted”). 
91 CITES, ETIS Report on Traffic, supra note 34, at 27. 
92 Id. at 29. 
93 Id. 
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data into international databases to be shared by the international 
community.94 Thus, it is incumbent that parties develop an 
interconnected database into which forensic data can be entered and 
ivory tracked. 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya95 answered the call. They 
translated the CoF16’s directives for a DNA collection and 
enforcement regime into the first wildlife-protection DNA database, 
the Rhino DNA Index System (“RhoDIS”).96 The RhoDIS database is 
based on the Combined DNA Index System, which the FBI uses to 
match a suspect’s DNA to a crime scene.97 By matching samples taken 
from seized horns with animal carcasses from national parks, reserves, 
game farms and zoos, RhoDIS represents an effort to ensure that 
individuals who imported horns as hunting trophies do not later sell 
them illegally as a faux pre-convention exemption.98 RhoDIS has 
proven successful: as of 2014, it has developed the DNA profile of over 
4,500 rhinos, helped in over 400 forensic cases,99 and secured twenty-
five convictions.100 
Regulatory regimes such as RhoDIS, help establish the extent to 
which ivory in illegal trade is derived from poaching, laundered under 
an exemption, or was leaked from one-off stockpiles. Arguably, an 
applicant’s written statement that its ivory was acquired pursuant to an 
exemption does little more than to reduce into writing the pre-existing 
presumption that the ivory in the seller’s possession was obtained 
legally. Evidently, FWS does not believe it would be “difficult for 
individuals engaged in commercial activities to provide the 
documentation necessary to demonstrate that their specimens were 
acquired prior to the Appendix I listing.”101 FWS owes a duty under the 
 
94 See generally CITES Secretariat Report, CoP16 Doc 54.2 /Rev. 1, at 10, 11, 
https://cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-54-02.pdf. 
95 Id. at 14. 
96 See Craig Donovan, Rhinos and the Illegal Horn Trade Top Cites Agenda, 28 NAT. 
RES. & ENV’T, 51 53 (2014) (“allows authorities to identify individual rhinoceroses from 
blood, horn, and tissue and serves as a repository for this information”). 
97 Topic Update: Rhino DNA Database Leads to Poacher Arrests, COUNCIL FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/genewatch/Gene 
WatchPage.aspx? pageId=426&archive=yes (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). 
98 See Donovan, supra note 96, at 53. 
99 Susanna Oosthuizen, Many DNA Successes in Poaching War, LOWVELDER (June 17, 
2014), http://lowvelder.co.za/200337/many-dna-succeses-in-poaching-war. 
100 See COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, supra note 97. 
101 Revision of Regulations Implementing CITES, 79 Fed. Reg. 30,399, 30,411 (May 27, 
2014) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pts. 10, 163, and 178) (indicates otherwise, as they found 
fraud to be commonplace in the domestic ivory market, even during a period in which there 
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treaty to determine whether an imported specimen is used “primarily 
for commercial purposes” or is otherwise CITES-compliant 
notwithstanding that determination made by the exporting MA.102 The 
fact that many CITES export certificates are based primarily on the 
representations of the exporter103 requires that FWS adopt more 
aggressive measures to bridge the information disparity between 
Parties104 and signal minimum standards of scrutiny to MAs.105 
Isotope and DNA testing would determine whether the ivory 
matches a time and origin profile of a one-off sale or other exemption 
criteria under CITES. A U.S. domestic regulation that requires forensic 
verification of a sample’s date and origin would: decrease domestic and 
international fraud; encourage greater uniformity in the standards of 
MAs; and provide local, federal, and international law enforcement 
with a growing inventory of data with which to monitor the global ivory 
trade.106 At approximately $100 per tusk, “DNA analyses are relatively 
inexpensive,” and are currently the only means by which an accurate 
determination of a specimen’s origin, date, and species can be made.107 
Forensic testing also promises to alleviate the financial burden for ETIS 
and other international monitoring groups by bolstering their collection 
efforts.108 When compared to the costs associated with uncertainty, 
such as additional elephants being killed, the ability to launder ivory, 
unreliable tracking, difficulty with enforcement, and inadequate 
deterrents to would-be smugglers, the financial burden on the applicant 
is proportional to the ends served. In other words, the benefits of 
forensic testing more than justify the costs. 
 
was no licensing requirements for domestic sales, and while other rules and standards were 
far more relaxed). 
102 Id. 
103 ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, supra note 30, at 7−8 (“Chinese export firm offers 
undercover EIA investigators government-sanctioned ivory export licenses by falsely 
declaring ivory ‘old stock’ acquired prior to CITES[.]”). 
104 Arthur G. Blundell & Michael B. Mascia, Discrepancies in Reported Levels of 
International Wildlife Trade, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 2020, 2024 (2005). 
105 See Reeve, supra note 89, at 888. 
106 Blundell & Mascia, supra note 104; NELLEMANN ET AL., supra note 68, at 70 (“Better 
information on the age and origin of ivory is essential to improving investigations, 
determining sources of ivory and smuggling routes, and strengthening international 
enforcement.”). 
107 See Samuel K. Wasser et al., Assigning African Elephant DNA to Geographic Region 
of Origin: Applications to the Ivory Trade, 101 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. OF SCI. 14847, 14852 
(2004). 
108 Id. 
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The United States’ failure to implement such reporting and 
enforcement scheme undermines its legal obligations under Res. 
CoP16, which inter alia, requires parties to: determine the seized 
specimen’s country of origin; report seizures to these countries; and 
coordinate transnational “follow up investigations” as collaborative 
law enforcement efforts.109 Similar to China, the new U.S. domestic 
registration system is also based on chain of title and is susceptible to 
corruption,110 fraud,111 uncertainty,112 and exploitation due to a lack of 
accurate trafficking data.113 Forensic verification of a sample’s date and 
origin discourages such fraud and uncertainty, and would provide state, 
federal, and international law enforcement with a growing inventory of 
data with which to track the movement of illegal ivory throughout the 
global supply chain.114 
Not only do the FWS rules fail to require forensic verification of the 
agency’s CITES certificates, they do not provide any information 
gathering or reporting mechanisms. As noted in Part III, DNA analysis 
and forensic techniques are indispensable to multilateral and sub-
national monitoring and enforcement efforts, because they offer the 
only means by which seized or sampled ivory can be verified as 
CITES-compliant. In other words, date/location analysis is able to 
determine whether the ivory item was sold legally in a one-off sale or 
whether the item pre-dates the convention (1990). Parties seeking to 
import tusks under a trophy exemption would submit sample 
specimens to FWS laboratory for analysis. The tusks’ DNA would be 
analyzed, assigned a unique identifier and cataloged into a database. 
Parties seeking to trade raw or worked ivory under any exemption, 
retroactive (i.e., following but prior to interstate trade) or otherwise, 
must establish that their item has not been limited to non-commercial 
use as a trophy, originated from a non-sanctioned source, or harvested 
from a non-exempt/post-Convention animal. 
 
109 See CITES, INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION SPECIES 
TRADE AND CONSERVATION RHINOCEROSES: REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT, 14 (2013), 
https://cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-54-02.pdf. 
110 See ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, supra note 30 (2008). 
111 GABRIEL ET AL., supra note 21, at 2. 
112 See CITES, supra note 109. 
113 See Reeve, supra note 89, at 884 (“[A] shortcoming [of CITES] is the unreliability of 
wildlife trade records.”). 
114 See generally Press Release, CITIES, CITES Standing Committee (SC65) 
Conclusions: a Focus on Front Lines, (July 14, 2014), http://www.cites.org/eng/news/pr 
/2014/SC65_ focus_on_the_front_lines. 
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All CITES certificates providing for commercial use should at least 
require isotope testing to verify the year of the death, in addition to the 
new permitting requirements. Where necessary, origin analysis would 
also be conducted. If a submitted sample fails the verification process, 
the parent item could then be impounded pending further 
investigation.115 From a prosecutorial perspective, the interdiction 
event inherently implicates the submitter as a potential suspect and 
provides a necessary starting point from which investigators can pursue 
civil or criminal prosecution under one of the domestic ivory Acts.116 
Such prosecutions are given force by the new rules, which shift the 
burden back to the defendant; thus the government would need only 
prove general intent to prevail under AfECA.117 
In sum, forensic testing, collecting and tracking requirements would 
not only advance the CoP16’s commitment to implement “DNA-based 
and forensic identification techniques for sourcing and aging ivory,”118 
but would increase the effectiveness of law enforcement. Despite the 
record high seizures between 2009 through 2011, there were almost no 
successful investigations of the criminals behind these transactions.119 
In fact, forensic evidence was not collected or analyzed so as to even 
ascertain the origin of the ivory it seized, let alone communicate seizure 
activities to other countries along the supply chain in a timely 
manner.120 Without collaborative law enforcement that has “the 
capability to bridge Africa and Asia along the primary trade routes,” it 
is doubtful that the global trade in illicit ivory will ever be curtailed.121 
As such, forensic testing helps to close U.S. domestic loopholes that 
undermine the law enforcement and normative imperative that 
commercial use of post-convention elephant tusks is wrong both 
 
115 See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(4)(A) (2012) (wildlife possessed or transferred in violation 
of the Convention, ESA, or its regulations, “shall be subject to forfeiture”). 
116 LaFontaine et al., supra note 47, at 5; see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371−3378 (2015). 
117 LaFontaine et al., supra note 47, at 5. 
118 CITES, Monitoring of Illegal Trade in Ivory and Other Elephant Specimens, 
Decisions of the Conference of Parties, CoP16, 20 (2013), http://www.cites.org/eng/dec 
/valid16/216. 
119 Milliken, supra note 22, at 12 (“Available data suggest that very few large-scale ivory 
seizures result in successful investigations or arrests (only 9 out of 76 cases reported to ETIS 
indicated that suspects had been arrested), but even then judicial failure results in almost no 
convictions of the criminals behind these transactions.”). 
120 Id. 
121 See CITES, INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION SPECIES 
TRADE AND CONSERVATION ELEPHANTS MONITORING OF ILLEGAL TRADE IN IVORY AND 
OTHER ELEPHANT SPECIMENS: ETIS REPORT OF TRAFFIC 23 (Mar. 2013), https://www 
.cites.org/sites/default /files/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoP16-53-02-02.pdf. 
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domestically and abroad, and that governments have the power to 
require decisive answers to key enforcement questions. 
B. Adequate Funding 
The meager $2 million increase from 2014 to 2015 for FWS’ law 
enforcement budget is insufficient to match the scale of the FWS’ 
revised policy objectives. Even if the new regulations were not flawed, 
the marginal increase to $67 million simply cannot carry the rules to 
fruition. Torrents of new CITES applications will overwhelm the 
agency’s already strained resources. Regulations that properly address 
these flaws require far more from the Appropriations Committee, 
especially in light of the budgetary resources that are appropriated to 
other agencies that contend with crises of proportional magnitude.122 
Despite their necessity, better national certification and monitoring 
techniques cannot adequately reduce demand alone. While increased 
funding must also augment governmental and NGO efforts to reduce 
consumer demand, FWS and USAID must enhance their support for 
urgently needed park and wildlife protection efforts in Central Africa 
and other range states, through support for park rangers and park guards 
and law enforcement training programs. Finally, the United States 
should work to improve intelligence sharing and cooperation through 
evidence gathering. Together, strategic increases to the FWS budget 
provide the necessary means by which the forensic testing program, 
advocated above, as well as increased sanctions, discussed immediately 
below, might be implemented. 
C. Increase International Pressure 
While China remains the key for stopping the growing poaching 
crisis facing Africa’s elephants, Thailand has the largest unregulated 
domestic ivory market in the world and consistently fails to meet 
 
122 Compare Ivory and Insecurity: The Global Implications of Poaching in Africa: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm on Foreign Rel., 112th Cong. 11 (2012) [hereinafter Ivory 
Hearing] (indeed, the “[i]llegal wildlife trade in the 21st century has an estimated value of 
$7.8-$10 billion per year,” making it the “fifth-largest illicit transnational activity 
worldwide, after counterfeiting and the illegal trades in drugs, people, and oil”), with U.S. 
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DEA Staffing & Budget, http://www.dea.gov/about 
/history/staffing.shtml (reporting 5249 special agents and $2.882 billion in 2014), and 
SHAWN REESE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34603, THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE: HISTORY 
AND MISSIONS, 4 (2014), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL34603.pdf (reporting 
$782 million for domestic and international operations, forensic support, information 
integration and technology transformation). 
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CITES requirements for internal trade in ivory.123 In other words, 
where China’s problem involves public ignorance,124 Thailand’s 
problem involves an inept law enforcement apparatus. Each problem 
requires a different international response, as discussed below.125 
The threat of trade sanctions prevents the exploitation of endangered 
or threatened species.126 As a preliminary matter, the U.S. Court of 
International Trade maintains exclusive domestic jurisdiction over 
trade embargoes resulting from wildlife protection laws. In considering 
wildlife trade restrictions, it is critical to distinguish between import 
prohibitions and sanctions. The ivory ban is an example of an import 
prohibition because it bans a product that has a “direct nexus to an 
environmental harm,” here the African elephant.127 Sanctions by 
contrast ban unrelated products for the purpose of influencing a foreign 
country’s policies or actions.128 Because the United States imports only 
a fraction of the world’s ivory compared to China, trade restrictions 
against Thailand and other target countries would be in the form of a 
sanction. 
The Pelly Amendment (“Pelly”) is the current instrument through 
which the United States could impose sanctions on Thailand. Pelly was 
designed to prevent trade in endangered species, whether or not those 
species originated in the home country.129 In other words, the United 
States can use Pelly sanctions in light or in despite of CoP resolutions 
and Convention procedures. Pelly authorizes sanctions against any 
nation that “diminishes the effectiveness” of any wildlife conservation 
program “for endangered or threatened species.”130 Once a 
determination is made by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce or the 
Interior that a Party’s actions have “diminished the effectiveness of an 
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international treaty, a certification to the President is required, which 
allows the discretionary imposition of sanctions.”131 
Under the AfECA, the Secretary could determine that Thailand’s 
domestic loopholes do not adhere to the CITES Ivory Control System, 
such that it is “diminishing the effectiveness of an international 
program for endangered or threatened species [CITES].”132 Pelly has 
proven effective, at least indirectly, because the threat of trade 
sanctions have often caused the problem to be addressed before such 
unilateral action is actually taken. However, Pelly’s major strength is 
also its weakness, as it bypasses CITES’ processes and multilateral 
cooperation. 
A possible improvement and instrument for semi-unilateral 
sanctions is the Targeted Use of Sanctions for Killing Elephants in their 
Range Act (“TUSKER”) (proposed in September 2014), which would 
amend the AfECA to “impose trade sanctions against countries 
involved in illegal ivory trade.”133 If TUSKER is enacted, the 
identification of a country by the CITES Standing Committee as a 
“country of primary concern,” (a country is a significant source or 
transit or destination point for illegal ivory trade) triggers Pelly 
certification with respect to that country.134 In other words, if 
consultations with a government are not “satisfactorily concluded 
within 90 days or if a government refuses to enter into consultations,” 
the President shall direct the Secretary to prohibit the importation of 
“wildlife products” from: China, Kenya, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Vietnam.135 
Sanctions are critical to U.S. ivory policy because they deincentivize 
nation-state behavior that collectively undermines U.S. efforts by 
addressing demand from the top-down; however, sanctions must also 
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accompany multilateral cooperation, as well as education and 
stakeholder initiates that combat rising demand from the bottom-up. 
D. Education Initiatives 
Pressure by CITES nations against private actors who are directly 
involved in illegal wildlife trade, or who facilitate such trade, have 
proven effective.136 NGOs can greatly influence consumer demand by 
linking negative public perceptions toward the killing of wildlife with 
consumer demand, through NGO brokered labeling agreements, U.S. 
government labeling laws, UN resolutions, and public media and 
outreach campaigns.137 For example, Sabena, the (former) Belgian 
national airline company, stopped transporting “laundered” shipments 
of ivory from Burundi to Belgium after intense public pressure by 
several multinational NGOs, including the WWF.138 Another example 
occurred when the U.S.-based NGO Earth Land Institute (“ELI”) 
confirmed reports that the largest U.S. tuna company, Bumble Bee 
Tuna, was sourcing illicitly caught tuna from Thai canneries, then 
fraudulently obtaining dolphin-safe labels.139 ELI launched a withering 
public outreach campaign140 that compelled Bumble Bee to agree to an 
intensive monitoring program that would allow ELI monitors on Thai 
ships to conduct forensic analysis of the fish haul.141 Within a year, all 
the canneries in Thailand were certified dolphin-safe and dolphin 
deaths plummeted.142 
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The initial period of success (CITES 1991-2000) had much to do 
with similar information sharing regimes between NGOs, 
governments, and the media. Once the public began seeing the mass 
destruction and brutal slaughtering of innocent elephants, a normative 
invocation immediately defined the public discourse. At one time, over 
40% of commercials played in the United States in 1989 were ads 
calling for the wholesale banning of ivory and the prohibition of 
elephant poaching.143 The fact that such intense public focus could be 
achieved in the United States before the proliferation of far-reaching 
telecommunication breakthroughs suggests that similar levels of public 
attention could be achieved or exceeded today, especially in light of 
China’s burgeoning middle class who increasingly enjoy such 
technological innovations. To the extent that globalism has streamlined 
channels of international ivory commerce and exacerbated the 
problem, it has also provided an enormous communication apparatus 
through which information campaigns can travel to more people than 
ever before. 
Along these communication channels, well-conducted and targeted 
awareness campaigns are necessary to reduce demand.144 Any trade ban 
should be supplemented by public outreach and education because 
“[u]nless elephants have preservation value as expressed by people’s 
willingness to prevent them from going extinct, the elephant is most 
likely to remain a species under threat of extinction.”145 Public 
education can also help dispel misconceptions people may have about 
the ivory trade and its connection to elephant welfare, enabling them to 
become more informed consumers who would decrease demand. For 
example, one survey found that 70% of Chinese consumers did not 
know that elephants were killed for ivory; “people thought elephants 
lose tusks the way people lose teeth.”146 Education campaigns provide 
the necessary normative and factual landscape in which all other policy 
recommendations presented in this paper are given their fullest effect. 
For a policy to truly succeed in the absence of a strong centralized 
enforcing body, which is the case with CITES, a normative shift must 
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communicate changing societal attitudes towards a particular behavior 
or custom. History has proven that transforming the public’s perception 
has the potential to outcompete economic incentives at the grassroots 
level.147 As such, public outreach campaigns are the cornerstone of 
successful wildlife management efforts and are indispensable to U.S. 
conservation policy. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States has the unique opportunity to again lead the 
vanguard of unilateral action against the international illegal ivory 
trade, but only if the current rule proposals incorporate the need for 
forensic verification, better monitoring and record keeping, as well as 
provide for a plan on how to consolidate new and existing data 
collection and law enforcement efforts into a single, reliable, and 
comprehensive database that would be made available to the 
international community. Realistic funding would allow FWS to 
implement an effective registration and tracking system domestically 
in the U.S., and fund public outreach and law enforcement campaigns 
abroad. Lobbying efforts should center on passing TUSKER because 
its sanctions are in light of—rather than in spite of—Standing 
Committee decisions, which legitimizes CITES and provides a model 
for other countries to adopt. Governmental efforts should align with 
NGO groups to promote public outreach.148 Adoption of these 
recommendations would stimulate bilateral action and serve as the 
African elephant’s best chance of survival. Indeed, at this critical stage, 
the consequences of under-enforcement are tantamount to no 
enforcement actions being taken at all. 
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